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I. INTRODUCTION
During 2004, it was my privilege to serve as Chair of the Association
of American Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. One of the
responsibilities of the Chair is to select the topic and organize the program
for the Section's annual meeting the following January. I had no difficulty
in selecting the topic for the January 2005 program. I wanted to build the
program around what I considered to be a very challenging and potentially
pathbreaking work by Professor Paul Schiff Berman in 2002, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction.1 In this work, Professor Berman maintains
that our traditional notions of jurisdiction need to be reconsidered in this era
of globalization,2 that the concept of jurisdiction is not merely about setting
the appropriate boundaries for governmental regulation but should be "the
locus for debates about community definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy."3
He also maintains that "the idea of legal jurisdiction both reflects and
I Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, University of
Pittsburgh; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. Paul SchiffBerman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (2002)
[hereinafter Berman, Globalization]. Professor Berman has expanded on this theme in
subsequent works. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, International
Law]; see a!so Paul SchiffBerman, Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, Redefining Governmental Interests].
2. Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, at 319.
3.Id.
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reinforces social conceptions of space, distance and identity." In this
regard, he proposes to explore the idea of jurisdiction and the cross-border
association of norms from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.5
Second, in this article, Professor Berman undertook to explore the
myriad ways that law and jurisdiction function transnationally.6 The reality,
as Professor Berman notes, is that people form affiliations, enter
relationships, cause harms and develop norms without regard to what he
calls the often "arbitrary" boundary lines of sovereign nation-states.7 He
questions whether jurisdiction and sovereignty should always be viewed as
coterminous and contends that the assertion of jurisdiction may consist of
more than the projection of state power.' He approaches jurisdiction from
an overarching framework that draws on theories of cosmopolitanism and
legal pluralism, recognizing and attempting to respond to the reality of
multiple community affiliations and sources of law-making, both extrinsic
and intrinsic to the nation-state. 9
To a commentator such as myself, who also teaches constitutional law,
whose conflicts work has been almost entirely in the area of interstate
conflicts, and who has viewed American conflicts law as an integral
component of the American federal system,"0 many of the ideas set forth
4. Id.
5. Id. at 319-20.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 495-96.
8. Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, at 495-96.
9. Id.
10. For works illustrating my view of interstate conflicts, the relationship between
constitutional law and conflicts law, and of conflicts law as being an integral part of the
American federal system, see, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, Across State Lines: Applying the
Conflict of Laws to Your Practice (A.B.A. Gen. Prac. Sec. Rep. 1989); see also Robert A.
Sedler, American Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Interest Analysis Approach to
Choice of Law, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ARTHUR T. VON M EHREN (J. Nafziger & S. Symeonides eds., 2002); Robert A. Sedler,
Interest Analysis, 'Multistate Policies,' and Considerations of Fairness in Conflicts Torts
Cases, 37 WILAMETTE L. REV. 233 (2001); Robert A. Sedler, A Real WorldPerspective on
Choice ofLaw, 48 MERCER L. REV. 781 (1997) [hereinafter Sedler, Choice ofLaw]; Robert
A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project for Federally-Mandated Choice of Law in 'Mass
Tort' Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1086 (1994); Robert A.
Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the
New Critics, 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983); Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations
on Choice of Law: The Perspectiveof Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59
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in Professor Berman's The Globalization of Jurisdiction have added a
different dimension to my thinking about jurisdiction and the conflict of laws.
At the same time, I have been trying to relate Professor Berman's theories
of cosmopolitanism and legal pluralism to the constitutionally permissible
exercise of jurisdiction, to state court choice of law, and to recognition of
judgments in the American federal system. As I found myself very
interested in Professor Berman's ideas on the globalization of jurisdiction,
I concluded that the subject likewise would be of interest to the members
of the Association of American Law Schools Section on the Conflict of
Laws and that it should be the topic for the January 2005 Section
program." The papers presented at the program have been expanded into
law review articles and are being published in this symposium in The Wayne
Law Review.
II. PROFESSOR BERMAN'S THESIS
In his article, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan
Pluralism,2 Professor Berman continues to develop the thesis that
globalization should have a significant impact on our approach to jurisdiction
and choice of law. As he puts it, the present is "an auspicious time to
consider the social meanings embodied in conflicts rules, or the ways that
judges applying conflicts rules might come to see themselves as
transactional actors."' 3 The conflict of laws, he writes, should be "the locus
for debates about community definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy."'4 He
maintains that "if communities are based not on fixed attributes like
geographical proximity, shared history, or face-to-face interaction, but
instead on symbolic identification and social psychology, then there is no
intrinsic reason to privilege nation-state communities over other possible
(1981) [hereinafter Sedler, ConstitutionalLimitations]; Robert A. Sedler,Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031(1978);
Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and
a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181 (1977).
11. The program was jointly sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools
Section on Anthropology and the Association of American Law Schools Section on
International Human Rights.
12. Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism,
51 Wayne L. Rev. 1105 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism].
13. Id. at 1106.
14. Id. at 1108.
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community identifications that people might share." 15 Professor Berman
then discusses three alternative concepts of community: subnational,
transnational and supranational. 16 Subnational communities are built around
a physical part of a national state, such as a city or town, or around
functions or activities, such as schools or religions. 7 Transnational
communities are communities of interest that cut across national boundaries,
the classic example of which is the multinational corporation. 8 Finally,
supranational communities reflect the primacy of governing norms that exist
above the nation state, being currently exemplified by the United Nations
and the World Trade Organization. 9
Recognizing the alternative concepts of community leads Professor
Berman to what he calls a cosmopolitan pluralist vision of conflict of laws,20
which starts from the premise that community affiliations are always plural
and can be detached from mere spatial location,2 but at the same time
rejects the notion of universalism and the idea that we are all members of
a global community.22 "A conflicts regime built on cosmopolitan principles,"
he says, "asks courts to consider the variety of normative communities with
possible ties to a particular dispute.' 3 The pluralist component of this vision
emphasizes that the state does not hold a monopoly on the articulation and
exercise of legal norms, but that normative commitments may also arise
from nonsovereign communities and that the conflict of laws must attend to
their jurisdictional assertions.24
Applying this cosmopolitan pluralist approach to questions of jurisdiction
would mean that courts "would look not to a mechanical counting of
contacts or delineation of territory, but to "a more nuanced analysis of
community affiliation, contact, and effect.' ' 5 This means that sometimes the
legal norms of non-state communities are recognized and enforced by state
courts and that sometimes some of the power exercised by the state has
15.Id. at 1109-10.
16. Id. at 1111.
17.Id.
18. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1111.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1112.
21.Id. at 1113.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1115.
24. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1116.
25. Id. at 1118.
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been delegated to non-state communities.26 He concludes:
This more fluid model of multiple affiliations, multiple jurisdictional
assertions, and multiple normative statements captures more
accurately than the classical model of territoriality and sovereignty
the way legal rules are being formed and applied in today's world.
Whether or not the nation-state is dying, we will need to come to
grips with the diffusion of law across borders and will also need to
understand that the normative statements law inscribes cannot be
so easily bounded off from the world of political rhetoric.27
In the second part of the article, Professor Berman explains how his
cosmopolitan pluralist vision of the conflict of laws would work in the areas
of jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of judgments.2" He does so
with the acknowledgment of the fact that actual conflicts will always arise
on a case-by-case basis, and that his analytical framework is not designed
to provide systematic doctrinal answers to specific problems.29 He also
suggests that in some cases, his approach really provides a conceptual basis
for what judges are already doing intuitively.30
In determining questions of jurisdiction, under the cosmopolitan pluralist
framework, he says that the focus would be on "whether the parties before
the court are appropriately conceptualized as members of the same
community, however that community is defined,"' and that "territorially
based limitations on the assertion of jurisdiction are inappropriate because
they reify arbitrary boundaries and foreclose debate about either community
definition or the evolution of substantive norms."'32 Berman suggests that in
practice, while courts continue to articulate the minimum contacts and
fundamental fairness test of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,33 they
are basing their decisions on community affiliations rather than factual
26. Id. at 1124-25.
27. Id. at 1125.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1125.
31.Id. at 1126.
32. Id.
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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contacts with the forum.34 Berman views this as a positive development and
one supportive of his cosmopolitan pluralist view in that it enables courts to
"articulate the substantive concerns about both overly broad and overly
narrow assertions of jurisdiction and thereby begin to delineate jurisdictional
norms that respond to the social meaning of community affiliation. 3 5
When it comes to choice of law, Berman says that the cosmopolitan
approach would borrow elements from each of the major methods of the
twentieth century: vested rights, governmental interests and substantivism.3 6
It would borrow from vested rights in the sense that it would separate
choice of law from the substantive norm to be applied.37 Courts would
consider the relative importance of the parties' community affiliations in
making the choice of law decision, and the choice of law decision would
"becom[e] the terrain for debate about the proper scope of community
dominion in an era when pure territorial borders no longer adequately delimit
community boundaries." '3 It would borrow from interest analysis by
expanding the notion of governmental interest far beyond a state's interest
in applying its own law "to effectuating [a] state's broader interest in taking
part in a global community." 9 It would borrow from substantivism in that
it would allow courts to "engage in a dialogue with each other concerning
the appropriate definition of community affiliation and the appropriate scope
of prescriptive jurisdiction," and enable the courts to "develop hybrid norms
for resolving multistate disputes."'
34. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1126-27.
35. Id. at 1128. Berman insists that a community-based analysis ofjurisdiction would
not necessarily result in broader assertions of jurisdiction than under current jurisdictional
schemes. Id. at 1131. Henotes that this analysis would make forum-shoppingmore difficult
for plaintiffs, who would be precluded from suing in a state with which they had no
associational ties. Id. It would also preclude transient jurisdiction, which while
constitutionally permissible is difficult to justify on any functional basis. Id (citing
Bumham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990)). What a community-based analysis would
do, says Berman, is to "go beyond counting contacts [and] inquire about the substantive
bonds formed between the member of the forum community and the territorially distant
actor."Id at 1131.
36. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1132.
37. Id. at 1133.
38.Id.
39.Id. at 1134.
40. Id. As an example of a case that should have been decided differently under a
cosmopolitan framework, Berman cites Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento
[Vol. 51:10651070
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In the area of recognition of judgments, Berman maintains that when an
American court is asked to recognize a foreign judgment, it should treat that
judgment much the same way that it is required to treat the judgment of a
sister state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.4' The American courts
should acknowledge the importance of participating in an interlocking
international legal system, and in a case where the parties have no
significant affiliation with the forum state, "there is little reason for a court
to insist on following domestic public policies, particularly when the parties
have no significant affiliation with the forum state."'2
Finally, Berman discusses plural sources of law-making authorities43
and says that it is possible to think of jurisdiction, choice of law and
recognition of judgments, "not only concerning official nation-state-tribunals,
but also concerning a whole panoply of norm-generating bodies, [whose]
decisions may have important impact even if they lack coercive power."
He uses some examples of how the decisions of non-legal norm-generating
bodies have influenced the actions of courts and governments,45 and
de Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 2003). Id. at 1135. In that trademark registration case,
a Spanish citizen registered "barcelona.com" with a Virginia-based domain registrar. He
formed a corporation under American law but had no other connection with the United
States. The Barcelona City Council asserted that he had no right to use "barcelona.com"
under Spanish trademark law and demanded that he transfer the domain registration to the
City Council. The FourthCircuit ruled against the city, holdingthat United States trademark
law applied because the domain name was registered with an American registrar company.
Id. He also uses the example of Indian-Americans purchasingbonds issued by India, which,
he says, obviously reflects the ongoing tie the these Indian-Americans feel for their
homeland, so that the purchases should be governed by Indian law. See Id. at 1135-36.
41. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1 (citedin Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12,
at 1136).
42. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1137. Berman is highly critical
of the refusal of a Maryland state court to enforce a libel judgment of a British court in
Telnikoffv. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997), an action between two British citizens
concerning writings that had appeared in a British newspaper. Id. at 1136. The defendant
subsequently moved to Maryland, and when the plaintiff sought to enforce the British
judgment there, the Maryland court held that because British libel law did not incorporate
the First Amendment-required "malice" standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), and its progeny, the Britishjudgment violated Maryland public policy and could
not be enforced. Id. This case is discussed further below, infra notes 226-33.
43. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1137.
44. Id. at 1137-38.
45. Id. at 1138.
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concludes that, "once we acknowledge the importance of changes in legal
consciousness over time, it becomes clear that enforcement power is not
the only factor in determining the normative power a jurisdictional assertion
might have." 6
Berman concludes by relating his cosmopolitan pluralist approach to the
work of courts and conflicts commentators.47 He says that this approach
"asks courts both to be in dialogue with each other and to take seriously the
rhetorical assertions of norm of non-state communities to that courts more
fully engage in a 'world constitutive process."' 48  For conflicts
commentators, the task, drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship as well as
work in other areas of law, is to "have as part of their core mission the
conceptualization and preservation of a world of plural legal voices engaged
in ongoing conversation and dispute."'9 The real goals of conflict of laws,
he maintains, are "first to make sure that the interaction among these voices
is as robust as possible and second to study more comprehensively the
changing definitions of community, physical and social space, borders,
citizenship, and affiliation that will always be contested through conflicts
challenges."'5 With these goals in mind, conflicts commentators will be
"ideally suited to offer both descriptive and normative insights about the
complex and interwoven world of law in the twenty-first century."'51
III. THE COMMENTATORS RESPOND
Professor Ralf Michaels cautions that in any analysis of legal pluralism
and the significance of globalization, we must not lose sight of the centrality
of the state." "The world of conflict of laws," he maintains, "is still a world
based strictly on the state, to the extent that the state administers conflict of
laws."' 3 "Instead of asking how globalization has changed the role of the
state in the world," Michaels urges, we should ask how the state should
46. Id. at 1141.
47. Id. at 1145.
48. Id. (quoting Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decisions, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 255 (1967)).
49. Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1145.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See RalfMichaels, The Re-State-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice ofLaw,
and the Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 5 1Wayne L. Rev. 1209 (2005).
53. Id. at 1258.
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change itself to deal with globalization, how the state can accommodate
multiple communities, and how conflicts can be resolved through a
combination of public and private interests.54 An important part of Professor
Michaels' article is his explanation of how the state deals with non-state
normative legal orders. As he explains, the state does not treat non-state
normative legal orders as "law," but only the normative legal orders of
another state.55 To the extent that the state takes account of non-normative
legal orders, it does so through incorporation, deference and delegation.56
If the state treated non-state law as law, it would thereby weaken its
position as a state.57
Michaels uses the examples of the Internet and the new law merchant,
which have been referred to by proponents of global legal pluralism as
autonomous non-state legal orders, to raise the question of what is "law." 8
He concludes that it is not possible to separate a definition of what is "law"
from the criteria that form the basis of the definition,59 and says that "global
legal pluralism rests on a politic of recognition." ° Multiple groups challenge
the monopoly of the state to make "law" and want recognition of their
status, autonomy and lawmaking capacity.
6
'
The question for the conflict of laws, he says, is whether the state,
through its law of the conflict of laws, does recognize or should recognize
non-state law as "law." 62 Michaels concludes that, almost exclusively,
states have rejected any claim that non-state law has the status of "law"
and have thereby has rejected global legal pluralism. 63 However, Michaels
also explains that the state can deal with non-state legal norms by
incorporation, such as when the common law incorporated parts of the law
merchant,' 4 by deference when it looks to commercial practice in
54. Id. at 1258-59.
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id. at 1214.
57.1d.
58. Michaels, supra note 52, at 1219.
59. Id. at 1225.
60. Id. at 1227.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1228. Michaels notes that within states, non-state law may be recognized and
applied as law, such as India applying the marriage law of different religious communities
depending on the allegiance of the spouses to those communities. See id. at 1131.
64. Michaels, supra note 52, at 1231.
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interpreting contracts, 65 and by delegation when the state defers to self-
regulation by interested groups in the case of collective bargaining
agreements and industry codes of conduct.'
Michaels discusses at length the reasons why the state does not treat
non-state law as "law." 7 In this context, he challenges Berman's argument
that as members of a global community states have a "governmental
interest" in the application of non-state law.61 Michaels argues that a state's
interest in being part of a global community is a justification for applying the
law of a foreign state, but not a justification for applying non-state normative
orders as "law."69 Rather, he says, the states that comprise the
"'community of nations' have a collective interest in maintaining their cartel
of law-making and law administration, and of not admitting outsiders into
their cartel." '7 He also demonstrates that in a number of contexts the
reasons that exist for one state to recognize the laws of another state do not
apply when the question is whether a state should recognize non-state
normative orders as law " He also demonstrates that legal pluralism not
only leads to a bilateral conflict between state and non-state law, but
between different non-state orders, so that a pluralist concept of conflict of
laws will lead to more not fewer conflicts.72
Michaels concludes that the conflict of laws cannot solve the challenge
from legal pluralism without also questiohing the role and nature of law. 73
Without acknowledging the "jurisdiction" of non-state communities, and
therefore, without challenging its own existence, the state may well develop
rules analogous to the conflict of laws to deal with non-state normative
orders.74 But it is not necessary for the state to assign "jurisdiction" to non-
state communities, and it may in fact be counterproductive to do so.
75
Another commentator, Professor Walter W. Heiser, analyzes at length
a specific and very important issue in the world of globalization: the use of
65. Id. at 1233.
66. Id. at 1234.
67. Id. at 1241.
68. Id. at 1242.
69. Id. at 1243.
70. Michaels, supra note 52, at 1243.
71. Id. at 1250.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1258.
74. Id. at 1259.
75.id.
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forum non conveniens in transnational tort actions to dismiss suits brought
by foreign plaintiffs against American defendants in an American court.76
He begins by discussing the debate over the use of forum non conveniens
in such cases-often posed as "a question of the moral and ethical
accountability of United States companies who, taking advantage of their
dominant role in the global economy, cause injuries overseas"77--and says
that the assumption underlying both sides of the debate is that the forum will
apply "domestic law in a transnational tort case."' Professor Heiser's
article examines "how the choice of law decision to apply the tort law of a
foreign country may affect the current debate over the propriety of forum
non conveniens. '' 7" He argues that the fact that an American court fmds
that the case should be decided in accordance with the tort law of a foreign
country may have little effect on the use of forum non conveniens in
transnational tort litigation."0
Professor Heiser begins by explaining the basis of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, and concludes that convenience has little to do with
why a defendant seeks a forum non conveniens dismissal."' The real reason
is that the defendant wants to force the plaintiff to "re-file the lawsuit in
another country whose substantive and procedural laws are more favorable
to the defendant.'" 2 In the case of a foreign country plaintiff, this means
that the plaintiff will have to file the suit in his home country, where
substantive law and the amount of damages recoverable are more likely to
be defendant-favoring, discovery more restrictive than it is in American
courts, and above all, where there is likely no trial by jury. 3 Heiser then
demonstrates the reasons why in practice the American defendant is highly
likely to prevail on the forum non conveniens motion.' These reasons are
76. See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of
Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1161 (2005).
77. Id. at 1163.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1164.
80. Id. at 1182.
81. Id. at 1167.
82. Heiser, supra note 76, at 1167.
83. The United States is virtually the only country in the world that provides for trial
by jury in civil cases, constitutionalizing this right in the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution and in analogous provisions of every stateconstitution. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
84. See Heiser, supra note 76, at 1165-77. He uses two well-known cases to illustrate
2005] 1075
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that: (1) There is little deference to a foreign plaintiffs choice of forum;85
(2) American courts are very likely to find that there is an adequate
alternative forum, since they are reluctant to find that another country's
court system is "inadequate;"8 6 (3) For the same reason, American courts
are not likely to find that there is "no remedy at all" in the alternative
forum;87 and (4) Balancing the various interest factors, courts downplay the
deterrent value of lawsuits in American courts against American
defendants.88
Professor Heiser advances two reasons why the decision of the
American court to apply foreign law in such a case would make it less likely
for the court to grant the defendant's forum non conveniens motion. First,
the foreign plaintiff hopes that the American court will apply the more
favorable domestic tort liability and damages law rather than the law of the
plaintiffs home country where the injury occurred.89 From the defendant's
perspective, the possibility that the American court will apply the more
favorable domestic law is a sufficient motivation to seek a forum non
conveniens dismissal.90 Second, from the trial court's perspective, the fact
that it will be faced with a choice of law decision and may end up having to
apply foreign law, makes the granting of the dismissal motion an attractive
option.9 Heiser maintains that "when the choice of law decisions is a binary
this protective effect. In In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 634
F.Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871
(1987), some 145 class actions had been filed in various federal district courts, seeking
money damages on behalf of over 200,000 persons who were killed or injured by a
catastrophic gas leak at a Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India. Id. at 845. Union
Carbide succeeded in gettingthe suit dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 866-
67. In Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377 (5thCir.2002), cert. denied, 582 U.S. 1012
(2003), the Mexican plaintiffs in a lawsuit in a Texas federal court were the parents of a
three-year old child who was killed in by the deployment of the passenger-side airbag of a
Chrysler automobile there. Id. at 379. Under Mexican law, the maximum amount recoverable
for the child's death was the equivalent of approximately $2500. Id. at 381. Chrysler
succeeded in getting the suit dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 383-84.
85. See id. at 1168.
86. Id. at 1169.
87. Id. at 1172.
88. Id. at 1175.
89. Id. at 11757
90. See Heiser, supra note 76, at 1177-8.
91. See id. at 11768 It should be noted that generally, the decision whether or not to
grant a forum non conveniens motion is in the discretion of the trial judge, and can only be
1076 [Vol. 51:1065
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one' 92 - whether the domestic or foreign law applies to all parties and all
claims - the court should make the choice of law decision before ruling on
the forum non conveniens motion. Not only is the applicable law a relevant
factor in the forum non conveniens balancing process, but, as he goes on to
say, "much of the interest-balancing undertaken for purposes of forum non
conveniens purposes is similar to the analysis required by many modem
choice-of-law doctrines." 3 He uses the example of a trial court comparing
the deterrence and regulatory interests of the country in which the
defendant manufacturer resides with those of the country where the injured
plaintiff resides for purposes of forum non conveniens, and says that, "the
process of identifying and assessing respective interests is not unlike a
governmental interest choice of law analysis."'4 Indeed, in terms of interest
analysis, this example presents the situation of the false conflict, so that the
law of the defendant's home state should apply. That state has a real
interest in applying its laws reflecting deterrence and regulatory policies,
such as strict liability and punitive damages, while the defendant's home
state usually will not have any interest in applying its defendant-protective
policy for the benefit of a non-resident defendant.95 It may be noted in this
regard that whenever a court dismisses a case on forum non conveniens
grounds, it has effectively made the decision to subordinate the forum's
policies and interests to the policies and interests of the alternative forum.
This being so, it can be contended that to the extent that the forum makes
the choice of law decision with reference to the policies and interests of the
involved states, it should not dismiss the case on forum non conveniens
grounds when this would displace the law that it would otherwise apply,
usually its own, if the case remained before it.
As Professor Heiser has pointed out, the controversy over forum non
conveniens proceeds on the assumption that in a transnational tort case,
once the American court decides to retain jurisdiction, it will decide to apply
reversed on appeal for abuse of discretion.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1179.
94. Id.
95. This is the result that occurs in cases outside of the products liability area and in
some products liability cases. Id. Some courts, however, hold that in products liability cases,
the law of the plaintiff's home state applies across the board, whether it is plaintiff-favoring
or defendant-favoring. See the discussion and review of cases in Robert A. Sedler, Choice of
Law in Conflicts Torts Cases: A Third Restatement or Rules of Choice of Law, 75 IND. L.
REV. 615, 626-28, 630-33 (2000).
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American law.96 And as I have contended above, when the American court
concludes that it will apply its own law because it has a real interest in doing
so in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, it should not dismiss
the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Professor Heiser then asks, if
the American court concludes that foreign tort law will apply in the case,
would this have an impact on the forum non conveniens decision?97 He
concludes that as a practical matter, the decision to apply foreign law "may
have little effect on the use of forum non conveniens in transnational tort
litigation.'"8 This is because, as Heiser explains, the decision to apply
foreign law will not eliminate the defendant's and trial court's desire for a
forum non conveniens dismissal."9 The American defendant not only wants
to avoid application of the domestic law of tort liability and damages, but
wants to avoid an American forum for the same reasons that the foreign
plaintiff wants to sue here: the American court's more liberal discovery
rules, contingent fees, and the right to trial by jury."° Likewise, from the
standpoint of the court ruling on the forum non conveniens motion, once the
court decides that foreign law applies, Heiser says that many of the public
interest factors would likely favor dismissal.'°' The application of foreign
law might be confusing to the jury, particularly where that law is complex
or ambiguous and the case would more appropriately be decided in the
foreign country forum. Also, if the foreign country has a greater interest
than the United States in applying its law in a transnational tort action,
American courts are less likely to see an interest in adjudicating the case
and imposing costs on their own legal system.10 2
It is in this context that Professor Heiser raises a very provocative
question: even though the American court has decided to apply the law of
the foreign state, should it recognize some obligation to foreign plaintiffs
injured by domestic defendants and retain the case for trial?0 3 He notes
that "the overwhelming majority of other countries do not recognize forum
96. See id. at 1182.
97. See Heiser, supra note 76, at 1182.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1185
102. See idat 1188.
103. See Heiser, supra note 76 at 1187
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non conveniens,"'' 4 so that they have a duty to adjudicate a transnational
tort action brought by a foreign plaintiff against a resident defendant
regardless of whose law they decide to apply. He then suggests that, "[i]n
the current global economy, perhaps a court in the United States should
recognize a similar obligation."'' 5 However, he is not optimistic that
American courts will do so, saying that unfortunately most courts in the
United States currently have a parochial, not a global perspective when it
comes to hearing international tort actions."° He concludes that there will
continue to be great controversy over the use of forum non conveniens in
transnational tort actions brought by foreign country plaintiffs in American
courts.'07 He also concludes that American courts are likely to continue to
take a parochial rather than a global approach to transnational tort actions,
so that defendants are likely to continue to assert forum non conveniens in
an effort to avoid having to defend the lawsuit against them in the American
legal system.'
Another commentator, Professor Janet Koven Levit, provides an
insightful dimension to our understanding of non-state law norms when she
explores the question of "How do these norms come to be?"'" She notes
that Professor Berman's cosmopolitan pluralist approach to jurisdiction
assumes that a multitude of inevitably overlapping and potentially conflicting
norms compete for relevance and dominance."0 She uses the case of
export credit insurance to demonstrate "how such norms gel transnationally
prior to assuming their place on jurisdictional battlefields.""' She does so
"from within," based on her on-the-ground experience at the Export-Import
Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank), a small United States government
agency that provides financial support to American exporters, and Trade-
Card, Inc., an Internet innovator in the trade finance realm."'
Professor Levit says that the transnational rules that govern much of
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1188.
106. Id. at 1189
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1192.
109. Janet Koven Levit, A Cosmopolitan View of Bottom-Up Transnational
Lawmaking: The Case of Export Credit Insurance, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1193, 1194 (2005).
110. Id. at 1193.
111. Id. at 1194.
112. Id.
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the every-day minutiae of export credit insurance are "transcendently
potent, endangering almost instinctual compliance.""' 3 She describes them
as "bottom-up transnational lawmaking,"" 4 and explains in detail how they
have developed to provide one solution to the recurring exporter problem of
how to extend credit to a buyer who might be thousands of miles away,
without choking the seller's working capital and concomitant ability to
continue producing and engaging in trade transactions. 15
Levit says that an export credit insurance transaction by definition is
transnational and "raises a host of cross-border issues that defy national
regulation.""' 6 In response to the need for industry "rules of the road," a
group of French, Italian, British and Spanish export credit insurers got
together in Beme, Switzerland in 1934, and formed the Berne Union, which
grew in size and role after World War II, and today has 54 members,
including both private companies and public entities.' 7 The Berne Union
regulates its members' export activities by means of a General
Understanding, which "prescribes specific, technical and at times
cumbersome rules to standardize the options that export credit insurers may
offer to buyers and sellers in order to attract their business.""' 8 Levit's
research shows that the Berne Union members overwhelmingly comply
with its rules, but at the same time, a degree of non-compliance is built into
the system." 9 There is a formal process by which members notify other
members of any deviation from the rules, and the other members may then
reciprocally derogate from the rules to match the non-compliance. '20
Professor Levit contends that the rules of the Berne Union function in
the same way as law should function: they are authoritative and effectively
binding.' 2 ' Moreover, she points out that they successfully facilitate over a
half trillion worth of international trade annually, and that formal lawmaking
institutions, such as the OECD, the WTO, and the European Union, have
appropriated many of them, "in essence transforming such rules from soft
113. Id.
114. Seeid. at 1195.
115. See Levit, supra note 109, at 1195
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1195-1196.
118. Id. at 1196.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Levit, supra note 109, at 1197.
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to hard law. ' 122 Thus, she concludes that, "bottom-up international
lawmaking is a soft, non-choreographed process that produces hard, legal
results.' 1
23
Professor Levit goes on to point out that like Berman's
cosmopolitanism, bottom-up lawmaking debunks the state's monopoly, but
that unlike Berman's cosmopolitanism, bottom-up lawmaking does not
depend on state-based enforcement of law, but instead "showcases the
potency of informal endorsement mechanisms. '1124 In the Berne Union,
enforcement of the rules remains an intra-community matter, and order is
reinforced through the reputation-laced sanctions stemming from public
brandishing and informal hallway gossip. 125
Professor Levit then emphasizes that bottom-up lawmaking is not
bound by geography. 126 Through the Berne Union, she says, a
"transcendental cadre of export finance practitioners forge potent ties and
constitute a viable lawmaking community.' 217 She further maintains that
while the Berne Union's General Understanding, while neither domestic nor
international law, "functions as well, if not better, than much we deem
law,' ' 28 and that bottom-up lawmaking is a "decisively process-oriented
approach to the law.' 29 Thus Professor Levit's article provides us with a
concrete understanding of how non-state law establishes norms that within
their sphere of operation perform the same function that is performed by
state law.
Professor Peter Spiro suggests that the state still remains too centered
in Berman's constellation and goes on to suggest how community
membership rules in the state, in particular the United States, are likely to
accelerate the decline of the state.' 3° Spiro maintains that just as it is
community membership that allows for the assertion of law's dominion
through the exercise of jurisdiction, community membership may also have
122. Id. at 1197.
123. Id. at 1198.
124. Id. at 1199.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1200.
127. See Levit, supra note 109, at 1200.
128. Id. at 1202.
129. Id. at 1202-1203.
130. Peter J. Spiro, The Boundaries of Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV.
1261 (2005).
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an impact on the law's content.' He says that constitutions have reflected
distinctively national communities, and that in the United States, in some
important respects the Constitution stands as the only clear signifier of the
American national community.'32 As national communities become less
segmented in the fact of globalization, and as the significance of national
borders diminishes, the segmentation of national constitutional systems will
also diminish, so that, "national communities are of declining salience to
individual identity and to the definition of law."'33
Spiro goes on to say that if communities are the central building block
of law, it is necessary to explore the criteria for membership in a national
community.' 34 He uses the example of Yasser Hamdi, an American citizen
by birth who spent more of his life in Saudi Arabia and was detained at
Guantanamo as an unlawful enemy combatant.'35 Recognizing what Spiro
calls a "persistent citizenship differential,"''36 the Supreme Court held that
Hamdi was entitled to a full and fair hearing to determine his status as an
unlawful enemy combatant.'37 Spiro maintains that it is possible to suggest
an argument for depriving Hamdi of his membership in the national
community of Americans, in that, "[i]t was clearly the case that he was in
no way a member of the community of Americans defined in any on-the-
ground, organic sense."'38 He goes on to say that, "it is not immediately
clear why the fact of his birth in U.S. territory supplies any basis for
community membership, given the rest of his life history, as against any
other person in the world who might want to claim membership for
instrumental purposes."'39 Looking to Hamdi's acts against the United
States and the acts of another American citizen, John Walker Lindh, who
was apprehended on the battlefield in Afghanistan and later pled guilty to
federal criminal charges of giving material support to a terrorist organization,
131. Id. at 1262-63.
132. Id. at 1263.
133. Id. at 1264.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Spiro, supra note 130, at 1265.
137. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Hamdi subsequently renounced his
American citizenship and was permitted to expatriate himself to Saudi Arabia. See Eric
Lichtblau, US., Bowing to Court Ruling, Will Free 'Enemy Combatant, 'N.Y TIMES, Sept.
23, 2004, at Al.
138. Spiro, supra note 130, at 1266.
139. Id.
1082 [Vol. 51:1065
LAW BEYOND BORDERS
Spiro asks, "Why exactly is it that a citizen cannot be expatriated upon the
commission of acts against the community, especially as undertaken as
members of other, hostile communities?""14
Spiro recognizes that constitutional constraints prevent birthright
citizenship from being qualified or expatriation triggers from being
revived. 4' But he says that to the extent that citizenship practices become
140. Id. at 12657
141. Id. The principle of citizenship by birth, jus soli, was a part of the received
English common law and was given constitutional status by section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to confercitizenship upon newly-emancipatedAfrican Americans, who
were denied the right of citizenship during the time of slavery. See Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. 393 (1857). The Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the jus soli principle
also ensured that the children of the waves of immigrants who arrived in the United States
during the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century and earlier part of the twentieth
century would become American citizens upon birth even if their parents were still aliens.
See United States v. Won Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). This means today that the children
of illegal immigrant parents are American citizens upon their birth in this country. Thejus
soli principle is a fundamental part of the American constitutional culture, and the principle
is no less fundamental because in isolated instances, such as in the Hamdi case, it operates
to enable a person who was not an "on the ground, organic member of the community of
Americans" to obtain the benefits of American citizenship.
By the same token, it is now a well-established constitutional principle that once
acquired, American citizenship can be lost only be a voluntary act or expatriation or by the
de-naturalization of a naturalized citizen. Congress may provide that certain acts may result
in expatriation, but only if those acts are accompanied with the intention to relinquish
American citizenship. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967). Nor can Congress constitutionally distinguish between native-born and
naturalized citizens with respect to voluntary expatriation, such as providing that a
naturalized citizen can be expatriated for a period of residence in the naturalized citizen's
former country. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). So, in answer to Professor
Spiro's question, "Why exactly is it that a citizen cannot be expatriated upon the
commission of acts against the community, especially as undertaken as members of other,
hostile communities?", it is because in the American constitutional system, American
citizenship is considered so valuable and priceless that it can be lost only by a voluntary act
of expatriation. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (holding that removal of American
citizenship as punishment for a crime is cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment). Of course, if it could be proved by the testimony of two
witnesses or by confession in open court that an American citizen actually "levied war
against the United States, or in adhering to our enemies, gave them 'aid and comfort,"' the
American citizen, precisely becauseofthat person's citizenship, would be guilty of treason.
U.S. CONST., art. III, sec. 3, cl. 1.
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the subject of exogenous constraint, such as when international human
rights law dictates the terms of membership, the less likely the citizenship
tie will reflect actual bonds of community.'42
Spiro then contends that insofar as bonds of community in the state
weaken, the less members will be inclined to privilege their relations with
each other relative to the rest of the world, and that in the context of rights,
this could "spell the decline of the state as the primary agent for the
protection of individual liberties."'43 At the same time, he says that
international institutions are becoming increasingly salient to the protection
of individual rights, reflecting the fact that on matters of basic rights, the
relevant community may now be genuinely universal.'" The downside of
this phenomenon is that transnational communities will be in a position to
inflict injustice, and that the state will be less able to police against those
injustices.'45 Spiro concludes with the observation that, "it will be important
to understand both that, as state-based communities face erosion, the state
can no longer fulfill its liberal purpose with the same vigor it has in the past,,
and that non-state communities may increasingly become an alternative site
of justice and injustice."'46
Professor Berman's cosmopolitan pluralist approach to the conflict of
laws puts much emphasis on the matter of community.' 47 Thus, in
determining jurisdiction under this approach, the focus would be on
"whether the parties before the court are appropriately conceptualized as
members of the same community, however that community is defined."'48
Berman also maintains that we should explore the idea of jurisdiction and
the cross border association of norms from a variety of disciplinary
perspectives. "'
With this goal in mind, we were fortunate to obtain the participation in
the program and in this symposium of Professor Susan Bibler Coutin, an
anthropologist in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at the
142. Spiro, supra note 130, at 1268.
143. Id. at 1268.
144. Id.
145. Id. 1268-69.
146. Id. at 1269.
147. See Berman, Cosmopolitan Pluralism, supra note 12, at 1105.
148. Id. at 1126
149. Id. at 1125
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University of California, Irvine. In her article,"5 ' Professor Coutin, to use
her own words, "analyzes social meanings, the multiplicity of affiliations,
official and unofficial legal practices and norms, and the law-making
activities of non-state entities. 1 51 Her focus is on what she calls "conflicts
of membership, '1 52 or situations in which there are disjunctures between
individuals' formal legal status and informal social location. 53 She discusses
four contexts in which these disjunctures arise so that she may raise
questions about the social meanings of jurisdiction, the complexity of
affiliations, the transnational significance of United States immigration laws,
and the ways that unauthorized migrants are transnational legal actors.'54
First, there is the matter of the social location of unauthorized migrants.
Professor Coutin notes that illegal entry or overstaying one's visa is a
transgression of legal space, in particular the space of the nation.'55
Moreover, a variety of enforcement practices partially exclude unauthorized
migrants from this legal space, even if they are physically present, such as
when government officials and private entities deny rights and services to
those who cannot prove that they are legally present in this country.'56
Subjectively, she says, unauthorized migrants have described these practices
as making them feel that they are not here.'57 They are located in, yet
outside of legal jurisdictions, and as Professor Coutin puts it, "[t]hey are
physically and often socially present, but that are also in some sense, located
'elsewhere."" 8
The fact that unauthorized migrants are "present yet absent" results in
their having multiple affiliations, so that legally, they may be citizens of their
country of origin, but they may also be affiliated socially and culturally with
their country of residence. However, as Coutin points out, the very activities
that make up these social affiliations-living and working in the United
States-are illegal for unauthorized migrants, so the very affiliation is itself
150. Susan Bibler Coutin, Law on the Ground: Jurisdiction, Affiliation, and
Transnational Law-making within Unauthorized Migration from El Salvador to the United
States, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1147 (2005).
151. Id. at 1148.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Coutin, supra note 150, at 1148.
157. Id. at 1149.
158. ld. at 1150.
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illegal. 59
Second, there is the deportation of long-time resident aliens, which
exacerbates these conflicts in membership. Coutin points out that 1996
immigration legislation expanded the range of crimes for which aliens could
be deported, applied the new definitions retroactively, and eliminated
waivers through which criminal aliens could petition to remain in the United
States, thereby increasing the number of long-time resident aliens who could
be deported."6 This situation can lead to what she calls "informal conflict
of laws,"'' such as when the country of origin no longer regards the
individual in question as a citizen of that country, 62 and such as when, as
in El Salvador, deportees are widely regarded as serious criminals. This
perception makes it very difficult for deportees to secure employment and
reestablish lives in El Salvador.'63 Third disaporic citizens have become very
important for certain sending states. Coutin points out that in the case of El
Salvador, in 2004 alone, migrants sent relatives in El Salvador approximately
2.5 billion dollars in migrant remittances which has become a mainstay of
the Salvadoran economy."6  Because of the importance of these
remittances to the Salvadoran economy, the legal status of Salvadorans has
become an important policy issue in El Salvador. As a result, the
government of El Salvador asserting "jurisdiction" over expatriate
Salvadorans by claiming expatriate El Salvadorans as part of the Salvadoran
citizenry, and taking actions to strengthen the connectioi between El
Salvadoran expatriates and their country of origin."'
159. Id. at 1152.
160. Id. at 1153.
161. Id.
162. The Supreme Court has held that after an alien subject to an order of removal has
been in detention for a six-month period, and there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the foreseeable future due to the unwillingness of any nation to take the alien, the alien must
be released from detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701-02 (2001).
163. Coutin, supra note 150, at 1153. She says that although they are legal citizens of
El Salvador, deportees may be regarded by other Salvadorans as foreigners and may suffer
discrimination at the hands of government officials. Id. at 1154.
164. Id. at 1154-55. She notes that following the January and February 2001
earthquakes in El Salvador, the United States awarded Temporary Protected Status to
Salvadorans in the United States, and that the United States and Salvadoran officials added
migrant remittances to the "foreign aid" package that the United States was sending to El
Salvador. Id. at 1155.
165. Id. at 1156.
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Finally, Professor Coutin details the efforts of unauthorized Salvadoran
migrants to influence American immigration law and policy so that they will
be able to remain in the United States.'66 These efforts have been
successful to some extent, which is due, in considerable part, to the
substantive ties that these migrants have developed in the United States.1
67
Professor Coutin concludes with some observations on the implications
of these conflicts of membership for the cosmopolitan as well as the law
and globalization approaches discussed in Professor Berman's work.
168
Professor Berman says that one benefit of the cosmopolitan schema is that
various types of connections and affiliations could be taken into account in
assessing membership.' 69 Thus, immigration policy could be developed in a
context of transnational interdependency, instead of primarily one of national
sovereignty, meaning that substantive as well as formal ties could be given
weight. 7 One example of a change in immigration policy would be to not
deport migrants who have strong substantive ties to the United States.' 7
Going further, Professor Berman suggests that the role that the law can
play in influencing the conditions that cause multiple affiliations should be
considered, such as looking for ways in which the law can be used to
eliminate poverty, human rights abuses, and other conditions that flue
migration.' Second, Professor Berman suggests that the move from
international law to law and globalization has the potential to broaden our
understanding of the various legal and other forces at work in transnational
legal contexts, such as causing us to examine the transnational implications
of immigration policies, the roles of non-state actors in law-making and the
relationships between "official" and "unofficial" versions of law.'73
Professor Coutin's discussion of the multiple affiliations of unauthorized
migrants brings this discussion to a consideration of how these multiple
affiliations impact the American legal system. The Supreme Court was
forced to confront the impact of multiple affiliations in Plyer v. Doe, 
1
'
4
166. Id. at 1156-58.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1158-59.
169. Coutin, supra note 150, at 1158, citing Berman, International Law, supra note 1.
170. Id. at 1158.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1159.
173. Id.
174. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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where the Court held a Texas law that denied a free public school education
to undocumented alien children unconstitutional."'5 The Court emphasized
that many of these children were likely to remain in the United States, and
that this being so, it was arbitrary and irrational for the state to deny them
the benefit of a free public school education.176 The Court also noted that
it was the responsibility of the federal government to control illegal
immigration, and the state's denying them a free public school education
conflicted with the effective policy of the federal government to permit
many illegal aliens to remain in the United States.177
In point of fact, the federal government has, to a large extent, tolerated
extensive illegal immigration into the United States, and illegal aliens are a
mainstay of the American economy, performing many of the low-level jobs
that Americans and legal immigrants are not willing to perform.17 We have
seen a form of amnesty for illegal aliens in a 1986 law, and it is a matter of
intense political controversy whether additional forms of amnesty should be
provided.'79 Unauthorized migrants will continue to enter the United States
in significant numbers, and the American legal and political system will
continue to have to confront this aspect of "globalization."
IV. THE AUTHOR'S PERSPECTIVE
I now turn to the subject of this symposium from my perspective as a
conflicts commentator whose work has been almost entirely in the area of
interstate conflicts and who has viewed American conflicts law as an
integral component of the American federal system. The overwhelming
majority of conflicts cases coming before American courts involve interstate
conflicts,' and it is my submission that American conflicts law has
175. Id. at 230.
176. Id. at 229-30.
177. Id. at 225-27.
178. As Thomas Donohue, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce has
put it, "Legislative action is needed 'right now' to address problems dogging many of the
estimated 8 million to 10.5 million illegal workers in the United States. If they went home,
we'd have to shut down the country." Stewart M. Powell & Judy Holland, Immigration
Plan Facing Lengthy Debate in Congress, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Jan. 8, 2004, at A6.
179. See Sue Kirchhoff & Barbara Hagenbaugh, Immigration: A Fiscal Boon or
Financial Strain, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2004, at lB.
180. I consider a conflict between the law of an American state and a Canadian province
to be essentially an interstate conflict in light of the substantial similarities in our laws and
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developed primarily with reference to the interstate case. I also maintain
that the American courts have dealt with international cases-those
involving foreign parties or events occurring outside of the United
States-essentially within the framework that the courts have established
for dealing with interstate cases, making adjustments that may be called for
by the international nature of a particular case.
It is clear from the articles in this symposium that the issues raised by
globalization do not have direct relevance for the resolution of the interstate
case and are not intended to do so. Rather, the issues raised by globalization
that are discussed in the articles in this symposium suggest that it may be
appropriate for American courts and commentators to consider, in a more
comprehensive way, how American conflicts law should be adapted to deal
with the international case. Should the doctrine that the courts have
developed to deal with the interstate case essentially be carried over to deal
with the international case, with perhaps only minor adjustments; or should
the courts develop a completely different approach for dealing with the
international case, taking into account the considerations of globalization
raised by the articles in this symposium? Additionally, when the issue is
necessarily one with international implications, such as the application of
American regulatory laws to activity taking place outside of the United
States,181 or the recognition of judgments issued by foreign courts, should
legal systems.
181. Neither Professor Berman's article nor the articles of the other commentators in
the symposium deal directly with this issue. Strictly speaking, the issue here is one of
interpretation of federal statutes, but in this area both Congress and the Supreme Court have
demonstrated a respect for the interests of foreign states in deciding how far American
regulatory power should reach. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S.
155 (2004) (holding in antitrust casecharging conspiracy between vitamin manufacturers and
distributors to fix vitamin prices in the United States and foreign countries, that federal
antitrust law does not apply to foreign companies located abroad who had purchased
vitamins only outside American commerce); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10
(1963) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to labor disputes,
foreign flagships and foreign employees, even though the ships are owned by a subsidiary
of an American corporation and operate in American waters); Romero v. International
Terminal OperatingCo., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (holding that the Jones Act does not apply to
claim of foreign seaman on foreign flagship injured when the ship was docked in an American
port); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (holding that the Jones Act does not apply
to claim of foreign seaman on foreign flagship injured while in port in foreign country,
although seaman joined crew in United States); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949)
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(holding that federal wages and hour law does not apply to claim of American citizens
working for American contractor in Iraq and Iran). See also McBee v. Delicia Co., Ltd., No.
04-2733, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15826 (1st Cir. Aug. 2, 2005) (holding that the Lanham
Act did not apply to trademark infringement claim of American entertainer where alleged
infringement took place entirely in Japan and user's registration of the trademark with the
name of the entertainer had been upheld by Japanese courts).
In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2169 (2005), the Court held that
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181-12189, which requires
"readily achievable" removal of barriers in places of public accommodation, applied to
foreign-flagcruise ships operatingin American waters, but that this provision did not apply
if barrier removal would bringa vessel into noncompliance with the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) or any other international legal obligation. In this
regard, the Court has stated that statutes "should not be interpreted to regulate foreign
persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international law."
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993).
In Hartford itself the Court held that American antitrust law applied to an alleged
conspiracy between American and British insurance companies that would have an effect
on the insurance market in the United States. Id. at 795-96. The Court also found that
principles of international comity would not counsel against the application of American
antitrust law in this case, because there was no conflict between American and British law
on the point in issue in that British law did not require the British insurance companies to
act in a manner prohibited by American antitrust law. Id. at 798. As this case indicates, the
Court is more likely to find that Congress intended that American law apply
extraterritorially where the acts committed abroad have the prohibited harmful effect in the
United States. In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), an American citizen
conducted a watch business in Mexico City, stamped the name "Bulova" on watches he
assembled there, and sold them as "Bulova" watches in the United States. Id. at 281. The
Court held that the Lanham Act applied, because the trademark infringement harmed
Bulova's business in the United States, and also noted that the defendant's attempt to
register the "Bulova" trademark in Mexico had been denied by the American courts. Id. at
285-88. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945) (holding
American antitrust law applied to the monopolization of the market for a product by a
foreign-based cartel, where American companies bought and sold aluminum from cartel
members). In this connection, the Securities Exchange Commission has asserted and the
courts have agreed that American securities laws can be applied to actions abroad that
involve stocks traded in the American securities markets. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that anti-fraud provisions of
securities law apply to tender offer involving two foreign corporations on foreign soil where
tenders offers were forwarded to shareholders of target corporation in United States,
although they represented only 2.5 percent of shareholders).
Congress is more likely to make American law applicable to actions of American
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the courts resolve these questions by taking into account considerations of
globalization?
At the same time, my constitutional law side cautions that for an
American court, considerations of globalization cannot override the
limitations on governmental action imposed by the Constitution.
Nevertheless, it may be that considerations of globalization can influence the
courts' interpretation of constitutional limitations in international cases.
It is also important to understand the role of the American states in the
American constitutional system. In American constitutional theory, upon
independence, the American states have succeeded to the sovereignty
formerly exercised by the British Crown over domestic matters. State
citizens abroad. After the Supreme Court held that Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions
did not apply to American citizens employed abroad by American employers in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991),
Congress quickly acted to overturn Aramco and make it clear that Title VII applies to
relations between American employers and employees abroad. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f), 2000e-
1. Congress has made it a crime for an American citizen or resident alien to have illicit sexual
contact with a child in a foreign country. 18 U.S.C. § 2423©). See United States v. Clark,
315 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (upholding the power of Congress to enact the
law under the commerce clause and upholding its extraterritorial application against a due
process challenge).
In the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, sec. 3, 112 Stat. 3304 (1998), Congress amended the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2, to expand its coverage of prohibited bribery of foreign
officials. The 1977 Act only imposed criminal penalties for bribery against officers and
directors of American companies and against American citizens, national and resident
employees of those companies. These limited restrictions, according to the Senate Report
on the proposed amendments, put American businesses "at a disadvantage relative to foreign
competitors who have continued to pay bribes without fear of penalty." The International
Anti-Bribery Act of 1999, S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998). The Report also concluded that
this bribery was "estimated to affect overseas procurement values in the billions of dollars
each year." Id. Under the new amendments, the FCPA's coverage is expanded to include all
foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the Unit ed
States and foreign nationals employed by or acting as agents of American companies for
actions that take place wholly outside of the United States. Id. According to the Senate
Report, the 1998 Act was enacted in response to American ratification of the Organization
for Economic Development Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the "OECD
Convention"), which called on the parties to the Convention to cover "any person" and to
"assert nationality jurisdiction when consistent with national legal and constitutional
principles." Id. at 2-3.
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sovereignty is thus a "given" in the American constitutional system, and the
American states do not depend on the federal Constitution as the source of
their power.' Thus, conflicts questions are determined by state law, and
the federal courts must apply state law in diversity cases.'83 Each state
court likewise exercises jurisdiction in accordance with its own law, subject
only to due process limitations. While the Full Faith and Credit Clause
mandates maximum recognition of sister state judgments,'84 the states are
free to decide what recognition they will accord to judgments of foreign
state courts. Although Congress has the power to regulate state court
jurisdiction and choice of law, it generally has not done so, and federal
treaties generally do not apply to state court choice of law decisions or
recognition of foreign judgments.'85 Professor Michaels cautions that in any
analysis of the role of legal pluralism and the significance of globalization,
we must not lose sight of the fact that the world of conflict of laws is a
world based strictly on the state, to the extent that the state administers
conflict of laws,186 and in the American federal system, this means each of
the American states, American territories and the District of Columbia. It
is from these perspectives that I want to discuss some of the globalization
issues raised by Professor Berman and the other commentators in this
symposium.
182. The Supreme Court has said that, "The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks
to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states." Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700,
725 (1869) (overruled on other grounds, but upholdingthis main issue, by Morgan v. United
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885)). Because this is so, the Court held in that case that during the
Civil War, the Confederate states were still a part of the Union from which they were trying
to secede. Id. at 726-30. Under the "equal footing" doctrine, all states are admitted to the
Union with the same attributes of sovereignty as were possessed by the original thirteen
states. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
183. See Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
184. See Faunterloy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
185. But see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961), where an Oregon "cold war era"
law denying inheritance of property situated in Oregon to non-resident aliens unless the
alien's home country provided a reciprocal right of inheritance to American citizens, was
found to conflict with an 1881 treaty with Serbia giving "most favored nation" rights to
Serbian citizens, including those residing in Serbia, then apart of the former Yugoslavia. Id.
at 192-98. Likewise a similar Oregon "cold war era" law, conditioning succession by foreign
heirs upon a finding that the practices of the heir's government would ensure that the heir
would receive the property, was held to amount to an unconstitutional intrusion on the
federal power over foreign affairs. Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
186. See Michaels, supra note 52, at 1258.
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Let us first consider the matter of jurisdiction. Professor Berman
maintains that under the cosmopolitan pluralist framework, the focus would
be on "whether the parties before the court are appropriately conceptualized
as members of the same community."'' 7 The "community affiliation"
approach would replace a "contacts" approach, which Berman says courts
are effectively doing in cyberspace jurisdiction cases.' 8 One of the cases
Berman uses to illustrate this point is France's assertion of jurisdiction over
the American Internet service provider Yahoo! in a suit by French plaintiffs
to block Nazi memorabilia and holocaust denial material from being
accessed in France through its service. "' While there was controversy over
France's exercising jurisdiction over Yahoo! as opposed to exercising
jurisdiction only over its French subsidiary fr.Yahoo, Berman maintains that
the assertion of jurisdiction could be supported under a community-based
analysis because of Yahoo!'s numerous substantive connections with
France. 90 I agree with this analysis, noting that if the situation were
reversed, the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court over a foreign
company effectively doing business in the United States through a
subsidiary and offering products for sale here, would comport with due
process standards of minimum contacts and fundamental fairness. (As I will
point out subsequently, however, the First Amendment would preclude an
American court from recognizing the French judgment against Yahoo! in
this case).
He then says that a focus on community membership "might also lead
us to rethink the scores of cases in which American courts have dismissed
on forum non conveniens grounds, human rights claims brought by foreign
nationals against American corporations.""'9 In a similar vein, Professor
Heiser has detailed at length how forum non conveniens has been used to
dismiss suits brought by foreign plaintiffs against American multinationals
to recover for injuries taking place in their home country, and has concluded
that the use of forum non conveniens by American defendants to try to
avoid the exercise of jurisdiction by American courts in these cases would
not decline even if the American courts applied the substantive law of the
187. Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, at 496.
188. Id. at 498-500.
189. Id. at 518.
190. Id. at 518-21.
191. Id. at 523.
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foreign plaintiff's home state.' 92 This is because what the American
defendants really want to avoid is having to litigate the claim under the
American legal system, with its more liberal discovery rules, contingent
fees, and the right to trial by jury. Berman says that existing forum non
conveniens doctrine based on the public and private factors set forth in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 93 "leaves little, if any, room for the argument that
American society and American courts have a social responsibility to
provide an American hearing for alleged misconduct of U.S. based multi-
nationals."' 94 In contrast, Berman says, "a conception of jurisdiction based
on community membership and responsibility would offer more space to
consider such an argument."'95
It is here that I submit that we should not be separating the question of
jurisdiction from the question of choice of law. More specifically, jurisdiction
should not be separated from the question of the circumstances in which
American law should apply to determine the legal liability of American-
based multinationals for conduct that has harmful effects in foreign
countries to residents of those countries. I maintain that when an American
court concludes that it will apply American state or federal law to such a
case, because the policy reflected in that law will be significantly advanced
by such application, it should not dismiss the case on forum non conveniens
grounds. In this day- of advanced technology, it cannot be inconvenient for
an American multinational, with its substantial resources and American
affiliations, to defend a case in an American forum. On the other hand, if
an American court is not going to apply American law to a transnational
case, and is going to decide the case in accordance with the law of a
foreign country, the fact that the defendant is an American-based
multinational and that the American legal system provides litigation benefits
to the foreign plaintiff does not seem to be a sufficient justification for the
exercise of jurisdiction by an American court.
I will use the In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal'96 case to illustrate this point. The "most tragic industrial disaster in
192. Heiser, supra note 76, at 1190.
193. 330 U.S. 501 (1947) sup'dinpart by 28 U.S.C.S. § 1404(a) (1948), amendedby
28 U.S.C.S. § 1404 (1996).
194. Berman, International Law, supra note 1, at 524.
195. Id.
196. 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affld, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 871 (1987).
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history," to use the words of the District Court, occurred in the City of
Bhopal, India. 9 7 It occurred at a plant owned and operated by Union
Carbide India, Ltd. (UCIL), which was incorporated in India under Indian
law in 1934, although a majority of its stock was owned by Union Carbide,
an American corporation.' The plant had numerous hutmets adjacent to
it, which were occupied by impoverished squatters. 99 UCIL, which was
heavily regulated by the Government of India, manufactured pesticides
there, at the request of, and with the approval of, the Government of
India."° A highly toxic gas was used in the production of the pesticides, and
for reasons not determined at the time of the filing of the suit, the gas leaked
from the plant in substantial quantities.2"1 "Prevailing winds" blew the
deadly gas into the overpopulated hutments adjacent to the plant and into the
most densely occupied parts of the city.2 2 The deaths attributable to the
leaking case were estimated to be in the thousands, and the injuries were
estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands.0 3 Livestock were killed,
crops were damaged, and businesses were interrupted. Following the
disaster, the Government of India enacted legislation providing that the
Government of India had the exclusive right to represent Indian plaintiffs in
India and elsewhere in connection with the tragedy. °' Instead of filing the
claims in India, the Government of India brought suit against Union Carbide
in a New York federal court.2 5 The suit was dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds.
2 01
I would submit that under Professor Berman's concept of community
membership, this was a case that properly should have been resolved in the
"community of India." All the facts relating to the disaster took place in
India, all the victims were Indian citizens, the operation of the plant was
heavily regulated by the government of India, the pesticides with the highly
toxic gas were manufactured at the request of, and with the approval of, the
197. Id. at 844.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. d.
202. Bhopal, 634 F. Supp at 844.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Government of India, and the Government of India had the exclusive right
to litigate the claims of the victims. For these reasons, the only law that
could constitutionally be applied by an American court to determine the
rights of the Indian plaintiffs against Union Carbide in this case was Indian
law." 7 It may be fairly suggested that in its effort to obtain foreign
investment and the economic benefits to India and its citizens from the
operation of the plant, the Government of India was lax in its regulation of
the plant, and so must bear some responsibility for the disaster. Additionally,
if the Indian legal system was inadequate to handle the claims resulting from
the disaster, this could have been remedied by improvements in the legal
system. If we are to look to community affiliation to determine the propriety
of a court exercising jurisdiction, the only courts that could properly exercise
jurisdiction over the claims arising from the Bhopal disaster were the courts
of India.
On the other hand, where an American corporation manufactures a
product in the United States that causes injury to victims in foreign
countries, and the law of the state of manufacture reflects a strong
regulatory policy, as reflected in the imposition of strict liability or the
authorization of punitive damages, that state has a real interest in applying
its own law to harm caused by the defective product. Thus, the state can
properly assert jurisdiction and apply its own law in products liability cases
arising from that manufacture, regardless of whether the harm occurred in
the same state, another American state, or in a foreign country. Since the
207. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). In order for the
application of a state's law to aparticularly fact situation to be constitutionally permissible,
that state must have a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id.
What this means as a practical matter is that a state's law may constitutionally be applied
in any case where the state had an interest in applying its law in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law, and the application of its law in the circumstances was not
fundamentally unfair to the party against whom the law was applied; or the state had
sufficient factual contacts with the transaction makingit reasonable for its law to be applied
to the transaction despite is lack of a substantive interest in doing so. Sedler, Constitutional
Limitations, supra note 10. Where the application of a state's law cannot be sustained on
either of these two bases, it will be found to be violative of due process and full faith and
credit.See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that in nationwide
class action in involving royalties on gas leases in Kansas court, where over 99 percent of
the leases and 97 percent of the plaintiffs has no connection with Kansas, Kansas could not
constitutionally apply its own law to determine royalties due on the leases).
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state will be applying its own law in a suit brought there by a foreign country
plaintiff injured in the plaintiff's home country. I would submit that the court
should not dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds.2"'
Professor Berman says that a community-based approach would "go
beyond counting contacts to inquire about the substantive bonds formed
between the member of the forum community and the territorially distant
actor."0 9 Looking to "substantive bonds," I submit that when a product has
been manufactured in one state or nation and distributed nationwide or
globally, there is a "substantive bond" between the manufacturer and the
person who has been injured by the product. This justifies the exercise of
jurisdiction either by the courts of the state where the defendant
manufactured the product or the courts of the state where the injured
person resides. Looking to considerations of fairness rather than to
considerations of "foreseeability" or "purposeful availment," it is fully fair
to both parties for either court to exercise jurisdiction in this situation.
Are there some circumstances in which considerations of fairness, as
reflected in Professor Berman's community based approach, would justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court over an American
defendant, but not over a foreign defendant? There may be such a situation
in regard to the manufacturer of a component part of a product. In Asahi
Metal Industrial Co. v. Superior Court,21 a plurality of the Court invoked
considerations of fairness and reasonableness in holding that due process
precluded the exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer of a
component part of a product that reached California and caused injury
208. As Professor Heiser notes, "[w]hen a trial court compares the deterrence and
regulatory interests of the country in which a defendant manufacturer resides versus those
of the country where the injured plaintiff resides for purposes of forum non conveniens, the
process of identifying and assessinginterests is not unlike a governmental interest choice-of-
law analysis." Heiser, supra note 76, at 1179. In terms of interest analysis, this case
presents a false conflict. The state where the product is manufactured has a real interest in
applying its own law while the state where the accident occurs, assuming that its law is
manufacturer-protecting, has no real interest in applying that law to protect an out-of-state
manufacturer. As a general proposition, this result obtained in interstate cases, although
some courts have held that the law of the plaintiff's home state applies in products liability
case, including where that state's law is manufacturer-protecting. See the discussion and
review of cases in Sedler, supra note 95, at 630-32.
209. Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, at 500.
210.480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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there."' In that circumstance, Professor Berman would probably say that
there was not a "substantive bond" between the Japanese manufacturer of
the component part and the injured victim in California. I wonder if the
same result would have obtained if the manufacturer of the component
operated in an American state. Perhaps I am suggesting that Professor
Berman's community-based approach may not be relevant in determining
questions of fairness in subjecting an American defendant to jurisdiction in
one American state or another. Nevertheless, it clearly is relevant in
determining the fairness of subjecting a foreign actor to suit in any court in
the United States.
When it comes to the cosmopolitan approach to choice of law,
Professor Berman says that this approach is firmly grounded in an
expanded notion of governmental interests that looks to a state's "broader
interest in taking part in a global community." This approach would allow
courts to "engage in a dialogue with each other concerning the appropriate
definition of community affiliation" and enable the courts to "develop hybrid
norms for resolving multistate disputes."2 3 It is in this regard that I found
it necessary to ask myself the question, "Should we have a different
approach to choice of law in the international case than in the interstate
case?" While it may be intuitive to say that in this era of globalization the
answer is "yes," however, I am not so sure that this is the right answer for
American courts operating within the framework of the American federal
system.
Let me explain what I mean by American courts operating within the
framework of the American federal system. I am a strong proponent of
interest analysis as the preferred approach to choice of law in the interstate
case. I maintain that in practice, at least in tort cases, courts, regardless of
which approach that they are purportedly applying, generally reach results
that are consistent with the interest analysis approach and apply their own
law when they have a real interest in doing so in order to implement the
policy reflected in that law. I also assert that in practice, the courts' use of
interest analysis in these cases has produced results that are functionally
sound and fair to the parties.214 Needless to say, many academic
211. Id. at 113-16.
212. Berman, Redefining Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 1864.
213. Id. at 1865.
214. Sedler, supra note 95, at 617-19. See also Sedler, Choice of Law, supra note 10,
at 788-89. I have also emphasized that in the "real world" of conflicts litigation, the question
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commentators reject any notion of forum preference and seek solutions that
try to accommodate conflicting state interests that do not make the result
depend on the forum in which a suit is brought.
If I am correct in my analysis of what American courts do in practice,
then we come back to the question of whether they should take a different
approach to the international case, and in those cases at least, seek to
achieve results that accommodate the conflicting interests of the American
state court and the forum country court. I would first ask, "why should
they?" What is there about the international case that makes it so different
from the interstate case, so that although a state would apply its own law to
the fact-law pattern presented in an interstate case, it should not necessarily
do so when that same fact-law pattern is presented in an interstate case?
Suppose that a resident of an American state is injured by a product
manufactured by a defendant in another American state. Under the law of
the plaintiff's state, there is strict liability for defective products and a court
is authorized to award punitive damages in product liability suits. Under the
law of the state of manufacture, liability for defective products is based on
negligence only, and the courts are not authorized to award punitive
damages. The plaintiff will bring suit in the home state, and that court will
apply its own law because it has a real interest in doing so in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law. There is no unfairness in that
state exercising jurisdiction and applying its own law in this case, since the
defendant voluntarily shipped the product into that state.
Now suppose that the product is manufactured in a foreign country. Let
us also suppose that the foreign country is a third-world country that is
trying to develop its manufacturing base such that its tort law is extremely
manufacturer-protecting, imposing liability only for gross negligence and
capping damages at a very low level. Since the foreign manufacturer has
ofjurisdiction cannot be separated fully from the question of choice of law, as it relates to
the possible states in which suit can be brought. Litigating lawyers know that the choice of
law result in aparticular caseand the possible outcome of the caseas well may often depend
on the state where suit can be brought. They quite realistically assume that a court is more
likely to apply its own law in preference to the law of another state and that where a state
has a real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the policy reflected in that
law, the courts of that state are highly likely to do so. This being so, plaintiffs' lawyers will
try to bringtheir suit in the state whose law is plaintiff-favoring, while defendants' lawyers
will assert jurisdictional and forum non conveniens objections to suit in the plaintiff-favoring
state and try to force the plaintiff to litigate the case in a forum whose law is defendant-
favoring.
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voluntarily shipped the product into the American state, it is subject to
jurisdiction there, and as discussed earlier, there are "substantive bonds"
between the foreign manufacturer and the person who has purchased the
product. Should the American state court apply its own law in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law, as it would in the interstate case,
or should it try to resolve the case by looking to "an appropriate definition
of community affiliation," or by developing "hybrid norms" to resolve this
multistate dispute?
I would submit that the court would not treat this case differently from
the way it would treat an interstate case, because it does not see its function
as an American state court to deal with issues of "globalization" that may
be implicated by its choice of law decision in an international case. For the
court to apply its own law in this case would seem to achieve a result that
is functionally sound and in no way unfair to the foreign defendant. If there
is a need to change the way that state courts resolve questions of choice of
law in international cases, it can be contended that in the American federal
system, it is up to Congress, exercising its power over foreign commerce,
to legislate that change. I come to the conclusion that considerations of
"globalization" are not likely to change the approach of American courts to
choice of law in international conflicts cases, nor do I think that they should
do so.
When it comes to recognition of foreign country judgments, I fully agree
with Professor Berman that American courts should enforce these
judgments in the same manner as they enforce the judgment of a sister state
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The one qualification is that
American courts may not do so when enforcement of the foreign country
judgment is precluded by the Constitution. This was the situation presented
in the Yahoo! case,215 which was discussed earlier in connection with the
exercise of jurisdiction. Yahoo! is an Internet service provider with its
principal place of business in California.216 Its American website,
yahoo.com, targets American users and provides many services, including
auction sites, message boards and chat rooms, for which Yahoo! users
provide much of the content." 7 Nazi discussions have occurred in Yahoo! 's
chat rooms and Nazi-related paraphernalia have appeared for sale on its
215. See Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, at 337-42.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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auction website.2 I' French criminal law prohibits exhibition of Nazi
propaganda and prohibits French citizens from purchasing or possessing
such material.2"9 Yahoo!'s French subsidiary, yahoo.fr, has removed all
Nazi material from its French website to comport with French law.22 °
However, it is possible for French citizens to access yahoo.com in France
and view Nazi materials. 22' This led to a suit by French organizations
against Yahoo! in a French court, and the French court issued an order
requiring Yahoo!, subject to a fine of approximately $13,300, per day to
remove all Nazi-related material from its server and to take a number of
other actions to prevent French citizens from accessing Nazi-related
material on its website.22
While the French court could properly exercise jurisdiction over Yahoo!,
for an American court to enforce the judgment against Yahoo! would
clearly violate the First Amendment. 23 Yahoo! operates its website in the
United States, and the First Amendment fully protects the dis semination of
hate speech.224 While commentators may debate the legitimacy of an
American-based Internet provider including material on its website that is
illegal in many other countries, the dissemination of that material is protected
by the First Amendment, and that is the end of the matter as far as
American courts are concerned.225
A variant of the Yahoo! case was presented in Telnikoff v.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Berman, Globalization, supra note 1, at 337-42.
222. Id.
223. The French plaintiffs have made no effort to enforce the judgment in the United
States. Yahoo! brought suit against the French plaintiffs in the United States, and a federal
court held that enforcement of the judgment would violate the First Amendment. Yahoo! v.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L. Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp.2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
The decision was reversed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit on the ground that the case was
not yet ripe. 433 F.3d1 19 (9th Cir. 2006). The case was remanded with instructions to
dismiss it without prejudice. Id.
224. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
225. Just as the First Amendment precludes the government from denyingadults access
to expressive material on the Internet that is "harmful to children," it precludes the
government, here acting through the courts, from denying Americans access to expressive
material on the Internet that may be illegal in other countries. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
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Matusevitch226 which involved a judgment entered in a libel action between
two British citizens concerning writings that appeared in a British
newspaper. 2 7 A British court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered
damages.228 The defendant subsequently moved to Maryland, and filed a
declaratory judgment action in a Maryland state court, alleging that the First
Amendment precluded enforcement of the judgment in the United States.229
The Maryland Supreme Court ruled that because British libel law does not
include the First Amendment-mandated requirement that the statement of
fact be knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity,
enforcement of the judgment would violate Maryland's public policy. 3 '
Professor Berman criticizes the decision, saying that in a case like
Telnikoff, where the parties have no significant affiliation with the forum
state, "there is little reason for a court to insist on following domestic public
policies in the face of competing conflicts values.""23 While I agree with
Professor Berman that domestic public policies should not cause a court to
refuse to enforce a foreign judgment, the problem here is that enforcement
of the British judgment may violate the First Amendment. The processes of
the American legal system are being invoked to enforce a foreign court
judgment that imposes liability for speech that is protected under the First
Amendment. The contrary argument is that the First Amendment is not
implicated in a case such as this where the underlying speech had no
connection with the United States.232 Without trying to resolve the First
Amendment issue, my point is that the question before the court should have
been whether enforcement of the judgment would violate the First
Amendment, and if the court held that it would not, the judgment should
have been enforced.
226. 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
227. Id. at 234-36.
228. Id. at 234.
229. Id. at 235.
230. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
231. Berman, Redefining Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 1869.
232. Professor Berman addresses the First Amendment issue somewhat more fully,
maintaining that there is a significant distinction between a court itself issuing a judgment
that would violatethe FirstAmendment and that court's recognizingthe judgment of another
court that reaches a contrary result. He also questions whether the action of a court
recognizing the judgment of another court is sufficient state action to bring into play the
strictures of the First Amendment. Berman, Redefining Governmental Interests, supra note
1, at 1871-72.
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With this introduction, we now turn to Professor Berman's article,
Conflict of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism and the
responses of the commentators.
